

lands and dignities (the Ecclesiastical Reservation), and to be content with a private declaration of Ferdinand in favour of toleration for the Protestant subjects of the ecclesiastical princes, which was not incorporated in "the Recess," or formal agreement, and did not therefore become law.

From the standpoint of religious liberty, the Peace of Augsburg, which put a period to the conflict of thirty-five years, is disappointing. It was a victory for the territorial principle as applied to religion, not for toleration. The subject must profess the religion of the prince, whether Catholic or Lutheran (*cujus Regio^ ejus Religio*). It made the prince the arbiter in matters of religion, the absolute lord over the consciences of his subjects. Morally, as well as politically, it strengthened enormously the territorial power of the magnates, who had in turn proved the master in the struggle with the lesser nobility, the peasants, and finally the emperor. The Reformation had thus not merely broken the unity of the Church; it had intensified the tendency towards the political disunion of the empire, and weakened German national sentiment without achieving either true political or true religious liberty. True, it had helped to frustrate Charles' dynastic absolutist schemes, but in so doing it had worked into the hands of the petty potentates, who were practically absolute within their own dominions both in Church and State, and whose ecclesiastical absolutism was to find classic expression in the work of Erasmus. This Augsburg Peace, moreover, conferred rights only on Catholics and Lutherans. It had no toleration for Zwinglians and Calvinists, not to mention the lesser sectaries. Even as between Catholics and Lutherans it was only a makeshift, and, while it prevented the further extension of the Reformation, it virtually guaranteed the preservation of the great spiritual electorates and the spiritual principalities which had survived the onslaught of Lutheranism. The German Reformation had, in fact, reached its limit at the hour of its greatest triumph. It bore in it the seeds of future strife, which were to bring forth the bitter fruits of bloodshed and ruin in the terrible drama of the Thirty Years' War. The issue which it hushed up, rather than settled, was yet to be decided on the battlefield, not in the Diet.

Nevertheless, there is something to be said for it even